SUMMARY: An interesting thought experiment claiming to highlight the connection between singularities and the global arrow of time is re-analyzed, and a further specification suggested. Against the criticism of Price (1996) , it is proposed that the original Penrose (1979) interpretation is still valid. Some ramifications of the result of our understanding of the cosmological arrow of time are sketched.
The problem of the origin of temporal asymmetry ("the arrow of time") in time-symmetric physics is one of the greatest challenges the physics and philosophy of the XX century passed on to the new millenium. One of the basic trends in the modern philosophy of space and time has been the attempt to complete the project begun with the rise of B-theories of time by constructing a truly atemporal ("tenseless") picture of the physical world (e.g. Grünbaum 1973 ). In a recent important and thought-provoking study, Huw Price (1996) has offered so far the most comprehensive attempt of building such a description. He excellently shows the dependence of various local arrows of time on the global, cosmological arrow, as well as irrelevancy of most attempts to derive the arrow of time on a local basis involving the temporal double standard. However, his treatment of the cosmological arrow is not entirely satisfactory, as we shall show on the example of the Penrose's thought experiment described and commented upon in the Chapter IV of his book. This example is characteristic for the somewhat ambiguous approach often encountered in contemporary physics and philosophy when arguments related to the various anthropic principles are considered. Specifically, we shall show that Price's criticism of the conclusion of Penrose is either wrong, or-and more probablysimply non sequitur for the discussion of the cosmological arrow of time.
The background of the issue considered in this note is the (un)famous question of the "naturalness" of orderly singularities of the (actual) big bang type. In order to account properly for the cosmological arrow of time arising from the time-symmetric physics, Gold (1962) suggested a highly regular nature of all global singularities. In particular, since recollapsing world-models were in vogue among the adherents to the general class of Friedmann models (as opposed to the steady state proponents), Gold suggested a time-symmetric recollapsing model in which the total entropy of the universe reaches the maximum at the point of maximal spatial extent, and subsequently decreases all the way back to the final singularity which is of regular type-actually indistinguishable from the initial one. Consequently, the arrow of time in the second half of the Gold universe will be reversed when compared to the present one, and we shall witness a "counter-clock world" (to bo-one can not know for sure, we find more acceptable to hold with the Penrose's original conclusion-that such things will not happen anymore in this case than in the case of "external" (in the sense of spacetime histories), small black hole. But the argumentation should be modified. Appeal to the mixing model does not seem to help, since if we cover the left half of Fig, 4 .1 of Price (1996) with a piece of paper and move it toward the right-hand side of the page, we see that as we approach "the other" singularity, the two models are indistinguishable-and we are dealing exactly with situations close to singularity (in a spatial sense, if the emphasis is necessary).
However, the original discussion of Penrose is not completely innocent, in the sense that one can interpret the situation in a different way than the inventor of this ingenious thought-experiment does. It becomes a non sequitur for the debate of the cosmological arrow of time if one somehow shows that the common premise of both Penrose's and Price's discourses, namely that the local and global gravitational collapse are not comparable at all. In a sense, one can give credit to Price here for pointing that a massive black hole is not "big enough" for comparison with the global big crunch. However, it may as well be more than size. If we accept a Machian picture of gravitation and cosmology, which has so profoundly influenced Einstein, local gravitational properties are determined by the distribution of all other gravitating bodies in the universe (Raine 1981 , and references therein). The conclusion that the global singularity in this picture is generically incomparable with anything local seems natural enough in this picture. In our opinion, the realization that the power spectrum of density perturbations may extend to very large scales, and that entire visible universe may be only an atypical region within much larger, and presumably inhomogeneous whole (e.g. Harwit 1995) . Therefore, even the notation of Fig. 12 .4 in Penrose (1979) is misleading, because the same symbol is used for both global and local singularities, which is not a priori warranted. In this light, it is more natural to conclude that Price's objection is simply a non sequitur, the local singularities being unable to create an arrow of time at all. Therefore, one may conclude that there are two possible ways for accounting for the presumable absence of miracles when approach to any local black hole is considered. The miracles will not happen because local gravitational collapse is something entirely different from the global one and incapable of causing the arrow of time even locally ("Machian view") or because the Gold view makes no physical sense ("Bronstein-Penrose" view)-or because of both. Note that by the first option, we may retain the Gold view of global singularities as places of low entropy dictating the arrow of time in subsequent local processes throughout the universe. By the second (and the third, of course), we need some novel explanation of the low entropy initial conditions, the explanation that the stronger versions of the anthropic principle may ultimately offer.
